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[T]he kind of conceptual explanation of tort law that 
economic analysis offers is deeply inadequate, in a 
way that becomes clear when we consider the sort of 
explanation offered by the principle of corrective 
justice …  That principle states that individuals who 
are responsible for wrongful losses of others have a 
duty to repair those losses.   … Corrective justice can 
provide an account of what tort law is, in a way that 
economic analysis fails to do.1
This quote from Jules Coleman nicely embodies two prevailing 
assumptions in contemporary tort theory.  The first is that jurisprudence and the 
philosophy of law are largely explanatory enterprises.  And the second is that the 
two dominant theories of torts – law and economics and corrective justice – are 
doing conceptual battle, so that if one view is true, the other must be false.  
I have no quarrel with the first assumption; indeed, I see it as a very 
positive methodological advance in our understanding of the purpose of 
jurisprudence.  Good philosophical analysis has always been, at its heart, 
explanatory.  We are confused, puzzled, or just intrigued, by some feature of the 
world, and the philosopher’s words help us better understand it.  Recent work in 
jurisprudence and philosophy of law has explicitly recognized the explanatory 
underpinnings of both general theories of law, and of specific areas of the law 
such as torts.  All of this is extremely healthy because our understanding of the 
2nature of explanation itself has increased a good deal in the last half century, 
particularly in the philosophy of science.2
The second assumption, however, is much more complicated.  I am 
generally sympathetic to the reservations often presented by critics of the law 
and economics approach to legal questions.  I am also predisposed to endorse 
the deeply normative implications that I see, though Coleman does not, at the 
heart of corrective justice accounts of private law.  All of this being said, though, 
it proves remarkably difficult to find articulations of these two views of tort law 
that explicitly contradict one another.  In fact, in many cases the most vociferous 
advocates of one theory concede the truth in the other’s account, though 
relegating it to minor conceptual importance.  I will argue that the most straight-
forward, perhaps the only, way to present the two schools of torts as logically 
incompatible is to carry our jurisprudential investigations clear to the level of 
basic human nature. 
II. 
[C]orrective justice … purports to explain tort law in a 
non-reductive way, by identifying the principle that 
ties together its central concepts and explains the 
practical inferences they warrant.  Tort law is itself a 
scheme of practical reason.  Typically, the plaintiff 
has the burden of presenting evidence and argument 
to support various allegations—among them, typically 
she was harmed in a way the law ordinarily protects, 
that the defendant breached a duty the he had 
toward the plaintiff; and that in breaching the duty, 
the defendant caused the plaintiff’s harm attributable 
to the defendant as his doing.3
3Coleman sees his project as one of “conceptual explanation.”  He is quite 
methodologically sophisticated and candid in his defense of a “pragmatic 
method” for conceptual analysis,4 but his general goal of unpacking the 
“analytical core” of an important social practice has been a staple of western 
philosophy since Socrates and his interlocutors discussed the “meaning” of 
justice, knowledge, piety, and the like in Plato’s dialogues.  Tort law is obviously 
a social practice of great interest and importance, so an improved understanding 
of its analytical core seems an entirely worthwhile intellectual project. 
 Consider as a start the way the state of California “defines” a tort. 
A civil wrong, wherein one person’s conduct causes a 
compensable injury to the person, property, or 
recognized interest of another, in violation of a duty 
imposed by law.5
The law professor may lament that “this does not tell us very much,”6 but the 
philosopher can appreciate the elegance of the definition.  A good pragmatist like 
Coleman can further highlight how definitions such as this bring together in a 
helpful way other central legal and moral concepts. 
[T]ort law is best explained by corrective justice.  The 
central concepts of tort law—harm, cause, repair, 
fault, and the like—hang together in a set of 
inferential relations that reflect a principle of 
corrective justice.  This principle is thus embodied in 
and explains tort law, and tort law, in turn, articulates 
that principle and makes its requirements explicit.7
The structural element of torts that Coleman most famously emphasizes is 
the “bilateral” nature of tort litigation. 
4Tort law’s structural core is represented by case-by-
case adjudication in which particular victims seek 
redress for certain losses from those whom they claim 
are responsible.  In the event that a victim’s claim to 
recovery is vindicated, her right to recover takes the 
from of a judgment against the defendant  …  Any 
plausible account of tort law must explain why claims 
are taken up on a case-by-case fashion.  A plausible 
account must also explain the bilateral nature of 
litigation.8
Ernest Weinrib goes so far as to suggest that tort liability, and more generally 
private law liability, exhibits a unique normative structure because of the 
phenomenon of bilaterality. 
The most striking feature of private law is that it 
directly connects two particular parties through the 
phenomenon of liability.  Both procedure and doctrine 
express this connection.  Procedurally, litigation in 
private law takes the form of a claim that a particular 
plaintiff presses against a particular defendant.  
Doctrinally, requirements such as the causation of 
harm attest to the dependence of the plaintiff’s claim 
on a wrong suffered at the defendant’s hand.  In 
singling out these two parties and bringing them 
together in this way, private law looks to neither the 
litigants individually nor to the interests of the 
community as a whole, but to the bipolar relationship 
of liability.9
In the much older vocabulary in which conceptual analysis was conducted 
in the last century, both what Coleman calls the “case by case” adjudication, and 
the phenomenon “biltererality” or “bipolorality,” seem to be logically necessary 
conditions for a tort.  If theories of torts are intended to provide quasi-
descriptive conceptual accounts of what is involved whenever there is a legal 
tort, then it certain counts hugely in favor of the corrective justice models that 
5they so nicely include these features.  At the same time, it is a serious liability for 
economic accounts of torts, since they are entirely silent about these necessary 
conceptual ingredients.  
The problem that confronts economic analysis, or any 
entirely forward-looking theory of tort law, is that it 
seems to ignore the point that litigants are brought 
together in a case because one alleges that the other 
has harmed her in a way that she had no right to do.  
Litigants do not come to court in order to provide the 
judge with an opportunity to pursue or refine his 
vision of optimal risk reduction.  Rather they seek to 
have their claims vindicated: to secure an official 
pronouncement concerning who had the right to do 
what to whom.  The judge is there, in some sense to 
serve them—to do justice between them; they are not 
there to serve the judge in his policy-making capacity.  
… Under economic analysis the litigants to a tort suit 
bear no normatively significant relationship to one 
another, or in any case, do not do so in any 
fundamental way.10 
But things surely couldn’t be quite as simple as this.  Why would there continue 
to be any scholarly controversy at all?  Any economic lawyer would have to 
concede that case-by-case adjudication and bilaterality are parts of the essential 
nature of our concept of tort law. 
III. 
Assume with Aristotle that the purpose of tort law is 
to do “corrective justice,” that is, to restore to a 
person what has been wrongly taken from him rather 
than to improve the allocation of resources.  It would 
still be necessary to inquire into the source of the 
norms on the basis of which certain conduct is 
deemed wrongful.  The source might be economic.  
Efforts have been made to explain ethical concepts, 
including the sense of being wronged, in economic (or 
closely related biological) terms.  It would be 
6consistent with these efforts to find that the tort 
concept of fault has an economic rationale also.11 
What are we to make statements like the above from Landis and Posner?  
Two of most accomplished economic lawyers seem willing to grant that 
corrective justice models of torts capture something essential in this central legal 
practice.  They insist, of course, that something deeply economic is required for 
an adequate understanding of torts, but they seem not at all troubled by 
characteristics like the essential bilaterality of tort litigation.  It seems as though 
the economist is explaining something altogether different than the conceptual 
structure of a tort action. 
 Landis and Posner remain concerned with questions of resource 
allocation, though they are willing to concede that this issue is not part of the 
meaning of a tort.   
[T]he common law of torts is best explained as if the 
judges who created the law through decisions 
operating as precedents in later cases were trying to 
promote efficient resource allocation.12 
According to the economist, what allows appeals courts judges’ decisions to 
further the social goal of efficient resource allocation is that the common law 
rules created in these decisions work to bring this about. 
Since the early 1970s a number of studies have 
appeared that apply economic theory to the common 
law – the body of English and American judge-made 
rules, may of great antiquity, governing torts (civil 
wrongs that result in personal injury or property 
damage), contracts, property, crimes, and many other 
fields of private conduct.  Surprisingly, many of these 
studies find that common law rules can best be 
7explained as if they were designed to increase 
economic efficiency.13 
One is almost tempted to say that the corrective justice theorists and the 
economic lawyers are simply talking past one another.  Coleman, Weinrib, and 
their colleagues are attempting to map out the conceptual ingredients, the 
meaning if you will, of tort law.  Posner, Landis, and their colleagues are 
engaged in an entirely different project, exploring the economic structure and 
benefits to current tort law rules.  But if this is really the case, why do the 
principles see themselves as engaged in philosophical battle?  We must step 
back for a bit, and explore more generally what is involved in offering an 
explanation, whether of a concept, legal practice, scientific phenomenon, or day 
to day occurrence. 
VI. 
To explain the phenomena in the world of our 
experience, to answer the question of “Why?” rather 
than only the question of “What?”, is one of the 
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and 
especially, scientific research in its various branches 
strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject 
matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena 
it investigates.”14 
Philosophers of science have long been preoccupied with the nature of 
(scientific) explanations.  One very general, but still viable, theory treats them as 
answers to “why-questions.”  This view of explanation is helpful in understanding 
the activities of not just the natural scientist (“Why is the light from distant 
galaxies shifted to the red end of the spectrum?”), but also the historian (“Why 
8did Europe go to war in 1914?”), the literary critic (“Why does Hamlet 
procrastinate?”), and the tort theorist (“Why did the court rule for the dock 
owner in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.?”).  Much of the work in many 
academic disciplines is the production of explanations or detailed answers to 
why-questions. 
 For most of us of a non-post-modern bent, we are also interested in the 
right, correct, true, or best explanation.  Theoreticians in the specific disciplines 
have had much to say about constitutes the best scientific, historical, etc., 
explanation.  If we generalize, however, I believe we are left with very broad 
accounts that, though abstract, are still useful.   
There is, of course, a problem about how one is to 
judge that one hypothesis is sufficiently better than 
another hypothesis. Presumably such a judgment will 
be based on considerations such as which hypothesis 
is simpler, which is more plausible, which explains 
more, which is less ad hoc, and so forth.15 
And even more insightfully: 
 
the only very general thing we can say about what we 
do when we evaluate evidence is rather coarse-
grained. When we do prefer one member of the list of 
rivals to the others, we do so simply because it 
comports best with the data we have, against the 
background of our relevant knowledge. Some rivals 
score better in some ways, others in others. We 
weigh the tugs in all directions and judge one rival to 
‘fit’ better than the others, all things considered. . . . 
So at bottom it is always a complex judgment of fit: 
which one fits most easily with everything we know 
about the matter.16 
9The notion of the best explanation is deeply ambiguous.  When 
confronted with a list of possible explanations for some occurrence we may 
prefer one for a number of very different reasons. 
• It is the clearest. 
• It gets at the heart of the matter. 
• It calls attention to factors easily overlooked. 
• It is the cutest. 
• It is the most plausible. 
• It is the only one on the list that is accurate. 
• It is true. 
• Et cetera. 
It is easy to imagine circumstances where one candidate was the clearest, 
another the most insightful, yet another the cutest, and all of them are “true.” 
 Consider a bit of office gossip.  Our colleague, Jane, was asked out for a 
dinner date last week.  Although it is none of our business, we can’t help 
ourselves, and we shameless speculate as to why she accepted the invitation.  
We manage to assemble quite a list of explanatory candidates. 
E1. Dick is tall, dark, and handsome. 
 
E2. Jane broke up with her long time boyfriend a 
couple of months ago. 
 
E3. Jane has had a crush on Dick since junior high. 
 
E4. Jane was charmed by the humble, almost shy, 
way in which Dick asked her. 
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E5. Dick uttered the words, “would you like to 
have dinner with me on Saturday?” with the 
intention of mak[ing] a social engagement 
with, Jane.  Jane so understood Dick’s 
utterance and responded, “I’d love to,” 
because she was also desirous of a social 
engagement.17 
E6. Jane’s central nervous system was in the 
complicated state XYZ at the time of Dick’s call. 
 
It is certainly possible that one of these explanations is perceived to be false, and 
that another is being proposed in its place.  Say Betty is confused about Jane’s 
history, and Michael corrects her.  “No, no, that wasn’t the guy she had a crush 
in junior high, in fact she never met Dick before last year’s Christmas party.  She 
said yes because she was charmed by the sweet way that he phrased the 
invitation.”  In such a circumstance, E4 is being proposed as a rival to E3. But as 
the hypotheses are stated in our list, they could all be simultaneously true. 
 There still could be debate, even if they are all true, about whether one or 
the other is better.  Perhaps Dorothy thinks that Carl’s observation about Dick’s 
looks really misses the point since Jane generally doesn’t care about those 
things, but is convinced that Jane has really wanted a chance to go out ever 
since the breakup.  Unless our office is a neuroscience laboratory, probably none 
of us care very much what Jane’s neurological state was.  And, unless we are 
lexicographers, the conceptual explanation about the meaning of a date, is 
probably not that important either. 
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VII. 
[T]he dominant function of the fault system is to 
generate rules of liability that if followed will bring 
about, at least approximately, the efficient – cost 
justified – level of accidents and safety.18 
Let us take economic lawyers at their word.  Richard Posner says nothing 
about proposing a conceptual model of torts, but rather a hypothesis about the 
function of the central liability rule in contemporary tort law.  Treating the 
economic analysis of torts as a functional explanation seems much truer to the 
economic lawyer’s project, and also nicely explains why the corrective justice 
theorists seem at times to be talking right past the economists.  Functional 
explanations have been the subject of a good deal of philosophical reflection in 
the past half century, and much of that work will prove useful in assessing the 
economic lawyer’s proposal. 
 Jules Coleman is open to the possibility that Posner and his colleagues are 
indeed offering functional accounts of torts and tort rules. 
Rather than seeking to reduce to economic terms the 
concepts that figure in tort law, this approach appeals 
to its supposed economic function as part of a causal 
explanation of the existence and shape of tort law.  
The best-known successful examples of functional 
explanations of this sort are found in evolutionary 
biology, in which natural selection and other 
evolutionary pressures are proposed as mechanisms 
that provide a causal link between a purpose or 
function and a biological trait that is said to serve that 
function.  The problem here … is that economic 
analysis fails to satisfy the requirements of a formally 
adequate functional explanation of this kind.19 
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Coleman’s discussion of the functional treatment of torts is a perplexing mixture 
of, at times, insightful philosophical analysis, and at other times, almost 
conceptual blindness. 
 Let us begin our investigation of all of this tricky theoretical terrain with a 
model of what a functional explanation ultimately is.  The philosopher of science, 
Larry Wright, proposed a textbook example of what Coleman called in the 
jurisprudential context, a “conceptual explanation” for functions.   
The function of X is Z iff: 
(i) Z is a consequence (result) of X’s being 
there, 
(ii) X is there because it does (results in) Z20 
Wright calls the central structure of this model a “consequence etiology” because 
the existence of the entity having the consequence – the result, function, or goal 
– is causally explained by the very fact that the entity tends to have this 
consequence.  This structure is remarkably robust, since it covers both goal-
directed accounts of behavior, “the rabbit is running in order to escape the dog,” 
and functional accounts, “the function of the heart is to pump blood,” as well as 
teleological explanations that candidly appeal to conscious intent and design, 
“the function of this switch is to adjust the volume,” and those where 
consciousness and agency are completely absent, “the function of the leopard’s 
spots are camouflage.” 
 If we import Posner’s functional hypothesis into Wright’s model we get the 
following.   
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The [dominant] function of the fault system is [the] 
generation rules of liability that if followed will bring 
about, at least approximately, the efficient – cost 
justified – level of accidents and safety iff: 
(i) [the] generation rules of liability that if 
followed will bring about, at least 
approximately, the efficient – cost justified 
– level of accidents and safety is a 
consequence (result) of the fault system’s 
being there, 
(ii) the fault system is there because it does 
(results in) the efficient – cost justified – 
level of accidents and safety . 
 
We are provisionally granting the empirical claims made in necessary condition 
(i).  What is of central concern is the consequence-etiology account of how the 
proposed function came to be there in necessary condition (ii). 
 Coleman correctly notes that: 
[o]f course, the simple fact that some practice P has 
outcome X cannot warrant the claim that X is the 
reason why P exists, explains P, or is P’s purpose or 
function.21 
The nose beautifully supports eyeglasses, but it would be ludicrous to suppose 
that the function of the nose is to support eyeglasses.  The consequence-etiology 
demands a plausible causal account of how the entity, behavior, or practice 
came to be there.   
Coleman quite reasonably rejects one account, though an account never 
really offered by economic lawyers. 
The most straightforward sense in which an outcome 
can be called the function of practice is the case 
where the practice is intended by its designers or 
participants to produce the outcome.  This kind of 
explanation is not “functional” in the sense we are 
14
now considering, because the function enters into the 
explanation only in so far as it is the aim or goal of 
some intentional agent. Clearly this cannot be the 
nature of the economic explanation, since no one 
wishes to claim that the many individuals who 
contributed over the centuries to the development of 
our tort institutions were aiming at economic 
efficiency.22 
Depending on whose history we are reading, economic considerations first 
entered jurisprudence with Holmes,23 Learned Hand,24 or Coase and Calabresi.25 
But at it’s earliest, this is long after the changes in common law rules that are 
being postulated as having the function of increasing efficiency.  Whatever else 
is going on, it is not a conscious movement among judges and academic 
lawyers. 
 Short of a thoroughly Darwinian account, Coleman sees no alternative to 
the intentional account of functionality. 
The challenge to the economic analysis should now 
be apparent.  It begins by rejecting the self-
understandings of the developers and participants in 
the practice, and in so doing it rejects the strategy of 
offering an intentional explanation.  Yet typical 
economic analysis of tort law (or of any other body of 
law, for that matter) offers no causal mechanism 
either—no analogue of random mutation and natural 
selection.  It appears to remain at the level of a Just-
So-Story.26 
Just-So-Stories have bad press in contemporary evolutionary theory.  The 
standard argument is that it is too easy to simply speculate about the adaptive 
value of some structural or behavioral feature, but if the biologist cannot offer 
evidence for its specific evolutionary history, that hypothesis remains entirely 
15
speculative.  As stated, though, this objection shows a very narrow view of 
science.  Lots of the most interesting and important theories started out as Just-
So-Stories – purely theoretical accounts, with little causal detail or empirical 
evidence.  The economic account would be worthy of our attention even if it is, 
at this stage of our understanding, merely theoretical.  But as I shall argue, 
Posner and his colleagues have offered a fairly detailed causal account. 
VIII. 
People who say that judges are not economists are 
sometimes confused about the meaning of 
economics.  If economics were limited to explicitly 
economic phenomena such as monopoly and inflation, 
it would be indeed odd to describe a judge deciding 
an accident case as engaged in economic reasoning.  
But if economics is defined as the science of rational 
choice or (equivalently) as the attempt to get the 
most from scarce resources, it becomes natural to 
conceive of a judge in an accident case as trying to 
ascertain whether the injurer and the victim were 
behaving carefully in the sense of trying to minimize 
the sum of expected-accident and accident-avoidance 
costs.  Of course the judge will not use these words 
(even to himself) to describe what he is doing; but 
the vocabulary of economics is designed for the use 
of scholars, not judges.27 
The economic lawyer’s causal account of the function of tort rules begins 
with a notorious theory of basic human nature.  Consider Posner’s 
characterization of economic behavior, and the behavior of the judges whose 
decisions shape the course of tort law. 
The basic assumption of economics that guides the 
version of economic analysis of law that I shall be 
presenting is that people are rational maximizers of 
their satisfactions—all people (with the exception of 
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small children and the profoundly retarded) in all of 
their activities (except when under the influence of 
psychosis or similarly deranged through drug or 
alcohol abuse) that involve choice.28 
The hypothesis of economic rationality is offered here as an empirical 
explanation of human behavior.  Obviously, if this hypothesis proves “false,” if a 
better explanation of human behavior is discovered, then the economic analysis 
of law, or anything else for that matter, becomes uninteresting to the point of 
moot.  Let us grant the economist her assumption, at least for the present 
purposes. 
 Now since judges, particularly appeals court justices, are taken to be 
economically rational, and because their job obviously involves choice, it follows 
almost deductively, that their basic human nature (homo economus) will play a 
central role in the decisions they reach, and in a common law system, the law 
that they fashion. 
The judges thus have a dual role: to interpret 
interest-group deals embodied in legislation and to 
provide the basic public service of authoritative 
dispute resolution.  They perform the latter function 
not only by deciding cases in accordance with 
preexisting norms, but also—especially in the Anglo-
American legal system—by elaborating those norms.  
They fashioned the common law out of customary 
practices, out of ideas borrowed from statutes and 
other legal systems (for example, Roman law), and 
out of their own conceptions of public policy.  The law 
they created exhibits, according to the economic 
theory that I am expounding, a remarkable (though 
not total …) substantive consistency.  It is as if the 
judges wanted to adopt rules, procedures, and case 
outcomes that would maximize society’s wealth.29 
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Granting these empirical – psychological, perhaps biological – assumptions about 
what make people tick, I don’t see how anyone can deny that the economist’s 
analysis of how torts have developed, and what we discover in current tort rules, 
is potentially explanatory. 
 At first glance it is very hard to understand Coleman’s charge that the 
economic analysis of torts fails to articulate a causal mechanism for the evolution 
of tort rules.  Judges, so the theory goes, are economic actors, and their basic 
rationality causes their decisions to move in the direction of great efficiency.  
This account seems paradigmatically causal.  Coleman, of course, understands all 
of this, but discounts it, I believe, because of a fundamental disagreement about 
the ultimate nature of law. 
 Posner is candidly a legal realist, although he prefers the title of 
pragmatist. 
Holmes argued that law is a prediction of what judges 
will do when confronted with a specific set of facts.  I 
… now merely note its consistency with the more 
conventional positivist view of the judge as rule 
applier and, on occasion, rule modifier or creator.  On 
this view, law is the activity of licensed person, the 
judges, rather than a body of concepts (rules, 
principles, whatever).  Judges employ discretion to 
change rules, and discretion is not “principled,” 
although it may be bounded by principles.  Indeed, to 
speak of “employing discretion” may be too grand.  
Judges change rules, period.  And in the end the law 
is what the judges do with your case.30 
And Coleman is an equally candid legal positivist, indeed, what he calls an 
inclusive positivist. 
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Law exists (is actual) when there is a rule of 
recognition and rules valid under it that are generally 
followed by the majority of the population.  
Acceptance of the rule of recognition from the 
internal point of by officials is a conceptual 
requirement of the possibility of law; acceptance from 
the internal point of view by the bulk of the populace 
is neither a conceptual nor an efficiency 
requirement.31 
Both are quite knowledgeable and sophisticated jurisprudential theorists.  But all 
their carefully drawn distinctions and amendments do not change the basic fact 
that for Posner law is essentially the behavior of judges, and for Coleman it is 
essentially a system of rules.  Realists admit that the behavior of judges creates 
rules, at least ones that govern easy cases, while positivists admit that judges 
(exercising discretion) create and change rules.  But what is primary, what gets 
at the analytic core of tort law, what gives us fundamental insight into what tort 
law is, these answers by realists and the positivists appear to constitute genuine 
rivals. 
 We are now in a position to address the charge that the economic analysis 
cannot provide a plausible causal mechanism for the changes in tort rules in the 
direction of increased efficiency.  The economic lawyer asserts that most tort 
rules, as with the common law generally, are simply the result of judicial 
behavior.  The economic lawyer sees the judge’s basic human nature the same 
as any other normal human being – a rational utility maximizer.  At a conscious 
level the judge may be thinking about precedent, abstract issues of social justice, 
or maybe nothing so grandiose at all.  It doesn’t matter; the judge is hardwired, 
19
as are we all, to think economically.  Increased economic efficiency is the result 
of judges living in more complicated and knowledgeable times simply doing their 
thing – making choices (we call them legal decisions) from the inevitable 
perspective of economic actors.  Or so says the economist. 
IX. 
 The development of the common law of tort 
has been marked by the opposition between two 
major theories.  The first holds that a plaintive should 
be entitled, prima facie, to recover from a defendant 
who has caused him harm only if the defendant 
intended to harm the plaintiff or failed to take 
reasonable steps to avoid inflicting the harm.  The 
alternative theory, that of strict liability, holds the 
defendant prima facie liable for the harm caused 
whether or not either of the further conditions 
relating to negligence and intend is satisfied. 
 It is most likely that theories of strict liability 
were dominant during the formative years of the 
common law.  But during the nineteenth century, 
both in England and in this country, there was a 
decided and express shift toward theories of 
negligence.32 
Epstein’s history is one of theories, not simply rules.  Most scholars agree 
that the development of tort rules of liability are more complicated than a simple 
change from strict liability to negligence, but at the same time, they agree that 
there has been a pronounced increase in the prominence and scope of the 
negligence standard.  Why has tort law developed in this way? 
 What is the best explanation of the development of tort law?  Is it the 
model of corrective justice, or that of economic efficiency?  These questions only 
make sense if we find a way of articulating the explanatory theories as genuinely 
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rival accounts of the history of common law rules.  We have already seen that 
the most plausible reading of the law and economics treatments of torts is to see 
them as functional explanations.   Many corrective justice interpretations of the 
development of tort rules can also be seen as offering functional accounts.  Let 
us focus on the following why-question.  Why has the history of tort rules moved 
in the direction is has – in particular, why have we seen an ascendance of the 
negligence rule?  The following two explanation now have, at least the 
appearance of logical rivalry. 
Te. The function of the development of tort rules, 
in particular the ascendancy of the negligence 
rule, is greater efficiency in resource allocation. 
 
Tj. The function of the development of tort rules, 
in particular the ascendancy of the negligence 
rule, is to accommodate to changing conditions 
and shared moral understanding our informed 
sense of what is just and fair. 
 
Even as so stated, a case can be made that these two functional accounts are 
not truly rival.  We have seen how the economist can concede that at a 
conscious level judges my think in terms of justice, but still be operating at a 
more basic level as economic actors.  Perhaps, in the final analysis, there really is 
no theoretical dispute at all.  It makes sense that the economic lawyer is simply 
trying to explain something at a completely different level than the moral 
philosopher or the corrective justice theorists.  To some degree, that is exactly 
what Posner and his colleagues have been claiming for more than a generation. 
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I am disinclined to take this route, however.  There is a hint of false 
modesty in the law and economics hypothesis.  I side with Coleman here.  The 
efficiency model of torts is offered as an insight into the basic nature of tort law, 
not some interesting footnote to general human, and therefore judicial, nature.  
One way to see the genuinely rival nature of the two accounts is to take much 
more seriously the language that judges use in their opinions, their scholarly 
writing, and to themselves as the ponder their decisions.  I agree with Dworkin 
that jurisprudence must always incorporate both internal and external 
explanations of legal phenomena.  
We need a social theory of the law, but it must be 
jurisprudential just for that reason.  Theories that 
ignore the structure of legal argument for supposedly 
larger questions of history and society are therefore 
perverse.  They ignore questions about the internal 
character of legal argument, so their explanations are 
impoverished and defective, like innumerate histories 
of mathematics, whether written in the language of 
Hegel or of Skinner.33 
To Dworkin’s “questions of history and society,” we can add economics, and to 
his “written in the language of Hegel or Skinner,” we include Adam Smith or 
Richard Posner.  But here, of course, I show my true colors.  I am no legal 
realist, though I agree that social, and indeed biological, factors play a significant 
role in the decisions our judges make.  Neither am I a positivist – though of 
course legal rules matter.  Ultimately, the sort of corrective justice account of 
torts I want to defend demands the perspective of natural law. 
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X. 
Society was not invented by reasoning men.  It 
evolved as part of our nature.  It is as much a 
product of our genes as our bodies are.  To 
understand it we must look inside our brains at the 
instincts for creating and exploiting social bonds that 
are there.  We must also look at other animals to see 
how the essentially competitive business of evolution 
can sometimes give rise to cooperative instincts.34 
Many theorists have speculated that the theistic presuppositions of 
classical natural law could be conceptually divorced from a moral theory based 
on an intimate connection between practical reasonableness, moral truth, and 
ethical discovery.  Much of traditional western moral theory can be seen in this 
light, and in jurisprudence the work of Fuller, Dworkin, and even John Finnis, 
argue that natural law need not depend on “a brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.”35 I want to investigate the possibility of deriving a recognizable ancestor to 
the classical natural law tradition from contemporary evolutionary biology. 
Classical natural lawyers explain objective moral truth and knowledge, and 
the behavioral inclination to what is morally required, in terms of God’s infinite 
power, wisdom, and love.  This is exactly the sort of explanatory framework 
proposed by eighteenth and early nineteenth century for accounting for the 
manifest structure, order and purpose in the biological world.  Darwin changed 
the plausibility of that earlier explanation, not by disproving the existence of God, 
nor even discrediting the design hypothesis per se. Natural selection simply 
offered a thoroughly secular and elegant account of biological order; one that 
was not logically inconsistent with God’s existence or planning, but did not 
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depend on His existence one way or another.  Secular natural law takes a similar 
stand on matters theological.  An omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect 
creator may well exist, but His existence is not required for moral truth, 
knowledge and inclination. 
Intriguing evidence in game theory, animal ecology, and evolutionary 
psychology all indicate that we all have behavioral phenotypes that lead us to 
behave, think, and feel in generally the same way regardless of the culture we 
find ourselves in – in short, that we have a species specific human nature.36 Part 
of our human nature I suggest is a genetic predisposition to behave 
cooperatively – i.e., morally – and to see and judge the behavior of others, as 
well as ourselves, according to the standard of cooperation. 
Biologically based moral realism was first speculated about, though not in 
those terms of course, by Darwin.  In the past one hundred and fifty years many 
others have seen the attractions of such an approach to moral objectivity.  At the 
same time, though, critics have always vociferously assailed the approach.  One 
line of attack can by now, I hope, safely be dismissed.  It is certainly true that 
many early advocates of the biological approach have, consciously or 
unconsciously, framed their arguments in racist and sexist terms.  Modern 
evolutionary psychology, however, is overwhelmingly innocent of that ancient 
charge.  Much more troubling, however, is an argument at the core of 
evolutionary biology itself.  An instinct to behave morally seems to imply a kind 
of group selection that many biologists believe is, if not impossible, exceedingly 
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rare and fragile in the natural world.  The problem is easy enough to see.  If we 
are genetically inclined to cooperate with one another, this provides a very rich 
medium for the evolution of cheaters.  As we will see shortly, cooperating with 
cooperators, bring reproductive advantages to all.  But imagine a mutant strain 
inclined to take advantage of others’ cooperation, fake it and pretend to be 
cooperator, but ruthlessly cheat at every opportunity.  Surely the genotype that 
produces cheaters would thrive in a world of cooperators, and soon that world 
would be dominated by cheaters. 
We all know that there are people who behave in precisely this way, and 
consistent with the biological speculation going on in this section, it’s reasonable 
to suppose that an inclination to behave selfishly is also part of our genetic 
heritage – indeed this is exactly what classical and neoclassical economics has 
been saying since the time of Adam Smith.  But, biologically based natural law 
insists that the individual reproductive advantages of being a cooperator in a 
world of fellow cooperators is so great that cooperative genotypes can be 
evolutionarily stable in spite of the short term benefits of cheating.  All of this is 
biologically controversial, of course.  Standard wisdom since the 1960s says it’s 
close to impossible.37 But, recent advances in evolutionary theory including gene 
selection, kin selection, and reciprocal altruism offer more attractive possibilities 
for biological moral realism.  And finally, a very recent and compelling line of 
argument candidly embraces group selection as a viable evolutionary 
perspective, and explicitly includes moral thinking as its central example.38 In 
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much the same way that secular natural law had to let the empirical facts from 
cultural anthropology concerning cross-cultural values determine its fate, the 
same is true of empirical facts in evolutionary biology.  I remain confident that 
evolutionary theory will vindicate this approach, but must confess that in spite of 
promising proposals, much work remains to be done on this crucial aspect of the 
theory. 
XI. 
All human societies have language.  As far as we 
know they always did; language was not invented by 
some groups and spread to others like agriculture or 
the alphabet. . . . The grammars of industrial societies 
are no more complex than the grammars of hunter-
gatherers. . . . Within societies, individual humans are 
proficient language users regardless of intelligence, 
social status, or level of education.  Children are 
fluent speakers of complex grammatical sentences by 
the age of three, without benefit of formal instruction.  
They are capable of inventing languages that are 
more systematic than those they hear, showing 
resemblances to languages that they have never 
heard, and obey grammatical principles for which 
there is no evidence in their environments.39 
[T]he ability to use a natural language belongs more 
to the study of human biology than human culture; it 
is a topic like echolocation in bats or steropsis in 
monkeys, not like writing or the wheel.40 
Noam Chomsky used intentionally loaded language in describing the 
biological approach to language.  He spoke of an innate, indeed candidly 
Cartesian, knowledge of the underlying grammar of human natural languages.  
Now, since the surface grammars of languages can vary in significant ways (one 
need only think of native English speakers trying to master German as adults), 
26
the knowledge would have to be of a “deep structure,” abstract, and somehow 
encoded in the human brain.  Chomsky has, for fifty years, remained confident 
that something like this deep structure would be discovered by linguists 
analyzing natural languages, and cognitive scientists analyzing the human central 
nervous system. 
Secular natural law postulates an analogous underlying moral syntax to 
most, if not all, culturally embodied moral systems – a deep-structure if you will, 
to human moral thinking and perception.  This hypothesis provides a starting 
point for explaining a host of theoretical worries about absolute moral truth.  The 
ontological home for objective values is a behavioral and neural phenotype.  Our 
knowledge of them is a direct intuition, but not a philosophically mysterious one, 
but similar to the immediate perception of correct grammar in Chomsky’s famous 
piece of non-sense – “Colorless green ideas sleep ferociously.”  And there is 
nothing motivationally peculiar in humans having an innate inclination to behave 
morally.  Indeed, on the evolutionary account it was precisely this behavioral 
phenotype that was being selected for. 
 Certainly two defining properties of our species are our ability to use 
language, and to develop culture.  The ability to adapt to social and 
environmental circumstances in a time frame of years and decades, rather than 
generations and eons, has given human beings a flexibility that is probably 
unique in the biological world.  It is no particular explanatory mystery, therefore, 
that we see apparently great cultural diversity in human moral practices and 
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perceptions.  Again, to push the analogy with language, human natural 
languages exhibit great diversity in semantics and “surface-grammar.”  The 
question, of course, is ultimately empirical.  Can we discover an underlying deep-
structure to human moral and legal practices?   
XII. 
There used to be a discipline called speculative 
psychology.  It wasn’t quite philosophy because it was 
concerned with empirical theory construction.  It 
wasn’t quite psychology because it wasn’t an 
empirical science.  But it used the methods of both 
philosophy and psychology because it was dedicated 
to the notion that scientific theories should be both 
conceptually disciplined and empirically constrained.41 
Jerry Foder believed in 1975, and continues to believe, that something like 
Chomsky’s universal grammar underlies, not just human natural language, but 
much of human thought itself.  Much of contemporary cognitive science, with 
little acknowledgement of Fodor, can be seen as a sustained effort to test this 
provocative and controversial hypothesis. 
 Secular natural law might be seen as a kind of speculative moral and legal 
psychology.  Very general and abstract models will be offered as candidates for 
the deep structure of moral and legal thinking.  It is almost impossible to over-
stress that these models will be intentionally over simple.  They will provide, not 
a complete representation of a legal system, let alone the detailed architecture of 
human neural structure which constrains human normative and legal thinking. 
 One very intriguing abstract model comes from contemporary game 





Cooperates  Fails to 
 Cooperate 
 
Cooperate       3,3       0,5 
Player A 
 Fails to Cooperate    5,0       1,1 
 
Player A, whose payoff is indicated first, reasons that failing to cooperate 
will maximize her utility, since if B cooperates, 5 is greater than 3, and if B fails 
to cooperate, 1 is greater than 0.  Failing to cooperate is A’s dominant strategy.  
By exactly the same reasoning, it is also the dominant strategy for B.  Hence, 
both players if they are rational will fail to cooperate.  The paradox, of course, is 
that utility maximization has doomed each player to a clearly sub-optimal payoff; 
both could receive 3 rather than 1, if they only cooperated with each other.  A 
and B need to find a way to mutually constrain their choices so that failing to 
cooperate is not an option.  
The best strategy in a single encounter prisoner’s dilemma game is not 
necessarily the best in circumstances where there are repeated encounters.  It 
remains true, of course, that the non-cooperative play will always yield the 
maximum payoff, but it appears that trust and cooperation can “evolve” through 
a process of mutual reward and punishment.  This was convincingly shown in a 
fascinating line of research conducted by Robert Axelrod.42 He conducted 
tournaments for computer programs where the contestants played “iterated” 
prisoner’s dilemma games.  Each program played all others 200 times 
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consecutively in the first tournament, and approximately 200 times in the 
second.  All of the submitted programs were required to play each other, as well 
as a copy of themselves, and a program that randomly cooperated.  Both 
tournaments had a clear winner charmingly named Tit-for-tat. 
 It is almost impossible to talk about Tit-for-tat without resorting to 
anthropomorphic language – the program is “nice” because it cooperates on the 
first play.  It “rewards” cooperation by its opponent by continuing to cooperate 
as long as its opponent cooperates.  It “refuses to be exploited” by retaliating 
with non-cooperation whenever the opponents fails to cooperate.  And it “doesn’t 
hold grudges,” “forgives,” and begins to cooperate again as soon as the 
opponent does.  All of this is the product of amazingly simple programmed 
instructions.  Tit-for-tat cooperates on the first play, and on any subsequent play 
n, it plays what the opponent played previously on n-1.
It is worth remembering that Tit-for-tat can never “win” any single contest 
during the tournament.  The best it can do is when it plays a universally 
cooperative program, or itself, is to end in a tie.  Tit-for-tat could easily have lost 
in Axelrod’s tournament.  All we need do is consider its fate had all of its 
opponents been straightforward utility maximizers.  Had there been at least 
eighty-one competing programs in the tournament, Tit-for-tat loses to all of 
them.  Furthermore, the relatively high number of opponents required for Tit-for-
tat’s loss is something of an artifact of the rules of the tournament.  Had Tit-for-
tat not been allowed to play itself – and thereby rack up 600 points in this one 
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round of the tournament – it would have lost to a field of non-cooperators of any 
size.  Tit-for-tat’s fate is even more disappointing in a field of suckers who 
cooperate no matter what, with one straightforward maximer.  Here it loses 
dramatically, with the scale getting worse the higher number of naive 
cooperators. 
 But, by far the most artificial aspect of Tit-for-tat’s remarkable success is a 
taken for granted part of the prisoner’s dilemma.  Every single play in Axelrod’s 
tournament is perfectly transparent.  Each opponent knows exactly what plays 
have previously been made.  There is no opportunity for covert cheating and 
non-cooperation.  There would be, of course, significantly less crime and non-
cooperation in the human social world, were every single one of our actions 
knowable by anyone who was curious.  Both happily (for those of us who value 
personal privacy), and sadly (for efficient law enforcement and general 
cooperation), however, the world of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is not the 
contingent world that humans find themselves operating in.   
 None of this is meant to disparage Tit-for-tat, or Axelrod’s methodology.  
The strategy proved remarkably robust in the original tournaments.  And, most 
intriguing of all, it seems to be instantiated in some general form in the biological 
world.  Several examples have been discussed, most of them somewhat grisly.  
Consider the case of: 
vampire bats, which spend the day in hollow trees 
and the night searching for large animals whose 
blood they can quietly sip from small cuts 
surreptitiously made in their skin.  It is a precarious 
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life, because a bat occasionally returns hungry, 
having either failed to find an animal or been 
prevented from drinking its fill from the wound. . . . 
Luckily, however, for the bats, when they do get a 
meal they can usually drink more than they 
immediately need and the surplus can be donated to 
another bat by regurgitating some blood.  This is a 
generous act, and the bats find themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma . . . [The bats] seem to play Tit-
for-tat.  A bat that has donated blood in the past will 
receive blood from a previous donee; a bat that has 
refused blood will be refused blood in turn.43 
Natural selection has clearly stumbled on a strategy for ensuring cooperation 
between vampire bats.  Might not a very similar strategy apply to humans?  
Indeed, I am suggesting that Tit-for-tat articulates at some very basic, and of 
course, grossly oversimplified level the deep-structure of interpersonal justice, at 
least within the context of two-person prisoner’s dilemma interactions. 
XIII. 
The just person is fit for society because he has 
internalized the idea of mutual benefit, so that in 
choosing his course of action he gives primary 
consideration to the prospect of realizing the co-
operative outcome.  If he is able to bring about, or 
may  reasonably expect to bring about, an outcome 
that is both (nearly) fair and (nearly) optimal, then he 
chooses to do so; only if he may not reasonably 
expect this does he choose to maximize his own 
utility.44 
Most contemporary research on justice in moral philosophy, political 
theory, and academic law focuses on social justice – the normative parameters 
of the relationship between individuals and the state.  As important and 
interesting as this work is, it glosses over a more basic notion of justice.  Moral 
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philosophy, and certainly the law, is ultimately concerned with what is right and 
fair between any two parties (individuals, corporations, or the state and the 
individual).  Can a plausible standard of interpersonal justice be articulated in a 
prisoner’s dilemma context? 
 David Gauthier has defended precisely such a theory.  His starting point is 
the rationality of mutual constraint – the fundamental lesson of the prisoner’s 
dilemma.  It can be in one’s best interest to be constrained, even when the 
precluded choice is in one’s short-term best interest.  It is better for you and I to 
be constrained to only cooperate, for if we are not constrained, if we behave has 
“straightforward maximizers,” we will each earn considerably less than had we 
cooperated in the first place.  Gauthier puts a candidly normative spin on all this 
game theory and rational behavior, arguing that the fundamental value that 
emerges from contemplation of the prisoner’s dilemma is justice. 
 Just individuals, according to Gauthier, have internalized an entirely new 
way of thinking.  Rather than reasoning as rational decision theory would have it 
– as utility or straightforward maxiimizers – they act from motives of constrained 
maximization. 
The constrained maximizer considers (i) whether the 
outcome, should everyone do so, be nearly fair and 
optimal, and (ii) whether the outcome she realistically 
expects should she do so affords her greater utility 
than universal non-co-operation.  If both these 
conditions are satisfied she bases her action on the 
joint strategy.45 
We have here, I would argue, a nice abstract characterization of the winning 
33
strategy exhibited by Tit-for-tat, and the biological altruism we saw in the 
vampire bats’ behavior.  I believe it also comes as close as anything currently 
available to articulating the neurological “deep structure” of human beings’ 
predisposition to behave cooperatively. 
 Gauthier is careful to note two very important considerations that are 
essential in order for constrained maximization to be rational.  First, the strategy 
only makes sense if one is reasonably confident that one is interacting with 
another constrained maximizer.  If one’s opponent in the prisoner’s dilemma is a 
straightforward maximizer, the rational play is of course non-cooperation – just 
individuals are not stupid nor suckers.  Second, constrained maximization 
requires a pre-reflective disposition to behave justly.  If individuals calculate their 
personal utility every time they interact with another, they will simply be 
sophisticated straightforward maximizers.  And a society of straightforward 
maximizers, however sophisticated, will be a Hobbesian state of nature, 
constrained only perhaps by the forces of law and culture. 
 For Gauthier the move from being a straightforward maximizer, to a just 
constrained maximizer is one of rationality, learning and culture.  I have no 
quarrel with any of those factors, but suggest that normal human beings are 
already programmed to see the world, and to behave, as constrained 
maximizers.  Living together as members of a social species necessitates mutual 
cooperation, and it would be surprising indeed, if the forces of natural selection 
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had not laid down such a normative deep-structure as a part of our species-
specific human nature. 
XIV. 
[J]ustice in transactions between man and man is a 
sort of equality indeed and injustice is a sort of 
inequality. . . . [Therefore] the judge tries to equalize 
things by means of the penalty, taking away the gain 
of the assailant.46 
The argument above did not argue that Tit-for-tat was the deep-structure 
of justice or moral truth, but that it provided oversimplified model of what it 
might be.  Recognition of this point is crucial as we turn or attention to corrective 
justice.  I will be treating this ancient theory of legal justice as another candidate 
for the deep-structure of biologically based moral realism, of secular natural law.  
This model, however, will clearly be closer to the “surface” than Tit-for-tat.  
Rather than focusing on game theory, computer tournaments, and totally 
abstract and fictitious payoffs, we will be forced to consider real people engaged 
in real disputes and instance of non-cooperation.  My strategy, here, will mirror 
that of Rawls in A Theory of Justice.47 I will argue that corrective justice much 
better explains our considered intuitions about what the law should be doing, 
and actual legal practice and common law evolution, than teleological theories 
like utilitarianism and law as economics. 
 Aristotle’s view of corrective justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is candidly, 
unapologetically, backward focused.  Justice, and ultimately the purpose of law, 
is to reinstitute cooperation between parties by restoring them, as far as is 
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possible, to the conditions they found themselves in before the breakdown in 
cooperation.  It goes without saying, of course, that many circumstances will 
require that the “equalization” be highly symbolic – prison time for a vehicular 
manslaughter, or financial compensation for a wrongful death.  Corrective justice 
sees the basic atoms out of which the system is derived as individuals 
encountering, cooperating and failing to cooperate, and wrongfully harming one 
another.  The law is a mechanism superimposed on these individuals for 
reestablishing cooperation when it has been threatened or broken down 
completely. 
 Teleological theories of law, utilitarianism and law and economics, also 
treat law as a mechanism for maintaining and enhancing social cooperation.  It is 
essentially forward-looking, and is an appropriate way of conceiving law when 
one is concerned with designing good social policy.  The questions that dominate 
when law is understood teleologically concern future outcomes – what will the 
effect of this legislation or ruling be for social cooperation in the future?  Will 
there be less crime?, more contracts?, fewer accidents?, greater economic 
efficiency?  The corrective justice/law and economics debate is often conducted 
as if the scholar had to choose sides in a war of fundamental values.  But as 
John Rawls clear saw over fifty years ago, there are two concepts of legal rules, 
or better, two ways of thinking about the law.48 We have already seen how 
champions of each side in the contemporary debate have each conceded that 
legal thinking is concerned with both corrective justice and economic efficiency. 
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I am anxious to defend more than an academic compromise.  I fully 
concede the insights that the economic study of law provides.  And I further 
concede that appeals court judges, not just professional policy makers, are 
professionally required to take the future social costs and benefits of their 
decisions into account when ruling in a “hard case.”49 Secular natural law insists, 
nevertheless, that the corrective justice reading of legal justice is closer to our 
biological deep-structure, and best accords with our considered intuitions about 
what is right and fair in controversial legal circumstances.  I will take a very small 
step to defending that very large claim with two brief case studies. 
VIII. 
However problematic its current role in justice, there 
is no doubt that vengeance is the original passion for 
justice.  The word justice in the Old Testament and in 
Homer too virtually always refers to revenge.  
Throughout most of history of the concept of justice 
has always been far more concerned with the 
punishment of crimes and the balancing of wrongs 
than it has been with the fair distribution of goods 
and services.50 
The retributive theory of criminal punishment has always had the faint 
odor of paradox.  Why is not the state’s investment of time, money, and emotion 
all for the sake of making a criminal’s life miserable an exercise in two wrongs 
trying to make a right?  The fine, after all, or the prison sentence, or the 
execution is hardly going to undo the previous wrong that criminal has already 
produced.  Now from a teleological perspective, of course, there is no mystery at 
all.  If the point of law, of legal punishment, is trying to most effectively manage 
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future criminal behavior, the price paid for punishment may well more than 
compensated for through the deterrence, or in the case of the criminal himself, 
the prevention, of future crimes.  But the retributivist seems left with little more 
than vague metaphors of cosmic scales of justice being thrown out of balance, 
and the function of punishment being an attempt to bring those scales back into 
balance. 
 Our culture seems preoccupied with retribution.  When there is a concern 
with crime, the result seems always a “get tough” policy – three strikes, 
mandatory sentencing, and the like.  It seems to matter little that these policies 
are hugely expensive, and that there is little empirical evidence that they 
accomplish much.  Nevertheless, ordinary citizens seem convinced that serious 
crime demands serious legal punishment.  And although there seems little 
consensus at all about what “serious punishment” should amount to, there 
seems to be wide consensus, at least among my students, that the current 
system is too soft on criminals. 
 I am not arguing for a second that I agree with my students, or the more 
red neck of my fellow citizens.  But I think that this widely held sentiment tells us 
something about the objective soundness of the retributive instinct.  The 
intuition that it would be unjust not to punish criminals is precisely what 
biologically based secular natural law would lead us to expect.  Our moral deep-
structure was formed in ancestor species, long before the advent of complex 
societies and sophisticated legal systems.  Justice in this context was always a 
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matter of cooperation between individuals.  Corrective justice quite correctly 
focuses precisely on these kinds of interactions.  Parties occasionally harm one 
another (they act uncooperatively), and something must be done about it.  The 
focus is to the past.  How can I (we?) do something about it?  The criminal must 
pay a kind of compensation.  We must equalize the past transaction, so that 
there can be cooperation in future ones.  This is precisely what Tit-for-tat did 
when opponents acted uncooperatively, the program “retaliated.”  Once the debt 
was paid, however, Tit-for-tat was willing to begin cooperating again. 
 One philosopher who has seen all of this very clearly is Robert Solomon.  
His frustratingly ignored book, A Passion for Justice, argues that justice is as 
much of a deep human emotion, as it is an intellectual or normative ideal.51 
Solomon discusses the retributive theory in terms of vengeance, and categorizes 
it as a negative emotion.  But if we soften the language just a little bit, the 
feeling of the objective rightness of retributive punishment is in no way a 
negative emotion.  According to secular natural law, it is a basic component of 
human nature, and one that has clear adaptive value for our species. 
IX. 
We are satisfied that the character of the storm was 
such that it would have been highly imprudent for the 
master of the Reynolds to have attempted to leave 
the dock or to have permitted his vessel to drift away 
from it. . . . It is claimed by the respondent that it 
was negligence to moor the boat at an exposed part 
of the wharf, and to continue in that position after it 
became apparent that the storm was to be more than 
usually severe.  We do not agree with this position.52 
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I want to conclude our discussion of corrective justice by examining a very 
famous case in the history of tort law.  In November of 1905 the steamship 
Reynolds was docked in Duluth.  As she finished discharging her cargo a severe 
storm developed and the ship’s master, after failing to find a tug, kept his ship 
moored to the dock, and weathered the storm.  Unfortunately, the ship was 
constantly thrown against the dock, causing damages of as much as $1,200 to 
the dock owner.  He sued to recover the damages, and the trial court ruled in his 
favor, awarding the plaintiffs $500.  The defendant then appealed. 
 The case is such a puzzle to tort scholars because of the principle of 
negligence in accident law.  Simply causing damage to someone is almost never 
sufficient grounds for recovery.  My company makes a better mousetrap, and 
your mousetrap factory goes belly up.  Certainly I have harmed you in a 
significant way, but absent special, almost certainly illegal, circumstances, you 
have no legitimate legal complaint against me.  By 1905 American tort law had 
firmly adopted the negligence principle.  In order to recover, you must show that 
I failed to take appropriate precautions, that I acted negligently in causing your 
loss.  Indeed, the plaintiffs claimed that the master had acted negligently by 
leaving his steamship tightly lashed to the dock throughout the storm. 
 But the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that argument.  Since the 
Minnesota Supreme Court failed to see negligence on the master’s part, one 
would have expected that the judgment would have been reversed.  But this was 
not the Court’s reasoning at all. 
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This is not a case where life or property was 
menaced by any object or thing belonging to the 
plaintiffs, the destruction of which became necessary 
to prevent the threatened disaster.  Nor it is a case 
where, because of the act of God, or unavoidable 
accident, the infliction of the injury was beyond the 
control of the defendant, but one where the 
defendant prudently and advisedly availed itself of the 
plaintiffs’ property for the purpose of preserving its 
own more valuable property, and the plaintiffs are 
entitled to compensation for the injury done. 
 Order affirmed.53 
The question that has vexed tort scholars is why the plaintiffs are entitled to 
compensation. 
 Economic law theorists can easily spin plausible account of the efficiency 
of such a precedent.54 Corrective justice advocates have had a much harder 
time, at least those wedded to the Aristotlean articulation: 
it makes no difference whether a good man has 
defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor 
whether is is a good or bad man that has committed 
adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive 
character of the injury, and treats the parties as 
equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being 
wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has 
received it.55 
As Richard Posner has stressed for Aristotle’s concept of corrective justice, “the 
duty to rectify is based not on the fact of injury alone but on the conjunction of 
injury and wrongdoing.”56 And as we have seen, there is no wrongdoing on the 
part of anyone. 
 Different scholars aligning themselves with the corrective justice camp 
have suggested different ways to avoid the problem.  Richard Epstein argues 
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that the concept of negligence is morally otiose, and tort law should return to a 
standard of strict liability.57 George Fletcher sees the ruling as correct because 
of an inequality of risks the parties imposed on each other – the ship’s master 
clearly put the dock owner at risk, but the inverse of the risk placing clearly does 
not hold.58 Earnest Weinrib claims that the dispute should not have been seen 
as a tort at all, but as a case of restitution.59 And Jules Coleman argues that 
cases like Vincent show us that there is such a thing as wrongful loss that 
corrective justice must redress even in the absence of wrong doing on the part 
of the defendant. 60 
Secular natural law is neutral between these attempts to square standard 
tort theory with the ruling in Vincent, though I confess to more comfort with 
Coleman’s analysis.  What I do want to argue, however, that the court’s ruling 
makes, not only legal, but normative sense.  Through the fault of no one, a 
seriously uncooperative situation between the ship’s owners, and the dock 
owners’ had arisen.  The court saw that this was unjust, and that correction was 
required.  The intuition that there was an inequity or injustice is obvious to 
anyone with a normal normative deep-structure.  And the court’s backward-
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